In late February, Lt. Gen. Morten Haga Lunde, head of the Norwegian
Intelligence Service, made a blunt statement on television regarding
China's efforts to steal military technology through cyber espionage.
"We can see that China is operating within Norwegian networks to obtain information that it can use in its own technological development," Lunde said, warning that some of the military secrets had already been integrated into China's weaponry. He did not say which technologies or companies were targeted, but neighboring Denmark's experience offers some pointers.
Danish national broadcaster DR reported in 2014 that for a period of four years "a foreign power had access to the computer systems of at least five different companies in the Danish defense industry." One is thought to be Terma, Denmark's largest defense contractor and, more importantly, a subcontractor to U.S. aerospace company Lockheed Martin for its fifth-generation fighter jet, the F-35. Terma supplies a variety of high-tech components and composite materials for the F-35, according to the company's website.
The fighter is co-funded by Britain, Canada, Australia, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. The large number of countries involved increases the opportunities for espionage.
In January, the hawkish Chinese newspaper Global Times published a story saying China had "mastered" the six key technologies of the F-35. The story had close-up photos of China's homegrown twin-engine stealth fighter, the J-20. The improvements made since the prototype was unveiled in 2011, and its striking resemblance to the F-35, surprised analysts.
LEAN AND HUNGRY LOOK This episode and a series of speeches by President Xi Jinping over the past six months give a glimpse into China's strategic thinking and direction. The leadership wants to transform the People's Liberation Army from a land-based military with a Soviet-inspired command structure -- that has not seen combat since 1979 -- into a leaner, more deadly force that can win a modern war. That means a greater focus on naval and air power, and the use of cyber and electronic warfare to reduce the gap with its hypothetical adversary, the U.S.
Since last September, Xi has given a number of speeches on the need for military reform. The measures include slashing the size of the PLA by 300,000; scrapping the country's seven military regions and replacing them with five new theater commands; establishing a new rocket force and strategic support force equal in status to the army, navy and air force; and dismantling the four powerful bureaucratic silos -- staff, politics, logistics and armaments -- reorganizing them into 15 new agencies directly answerable to the Central Military Commission, led by Xi.
"As the country progresses from a large country to a large and powerful one, defense and military development stands at a new and historic starting line," Xi said at a meeting of the Central Military Commission in Beijing last November. In March, speaking at a ceremony marking the launch of the five theater commands, Xi said: "We need to establish a highly effective chain of command so that when we fight we will definitely win." In his speeches, Xi emphasizes creating a military that can "win wars" -- an admission that the PLA, in its current form, would struggle to win a modern battle.
China will cut its noncombat divisions -- singers, dancers, chefs, hospital staff, journalists -- and focus on areas the PLA needs to strengthen, such as cyberwarfare, drones, intercepting enemy aircraft and rescuing hostages.
The seven military regions were created primarily to prevent a ground invasion from the Soviet Union and to quell uprisings in the west. Today, a Russian invasion is much less likely than a confrontation in the South or East China seas.
Most of China's pressing concerns are at sea, so most of its military spending will be devoted to strengthening its navy. China is building a second aircraft carrier in the northeastern port of Dalian, and fighters to fly from it.
To keep U.S. aircraft carriers away from the territorial waters China claims, Beijing is developing anti-ship ballistic missiles, including the Dongfeng DF-21. These "carrier killers" are part of China's so-called anti-access/area denial strategy. An advanced version, the DF-26, is China's first intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching U.S. bases on Guam.
Although the new weapons are intimidating, China's leaders know they are years behind the U.S. in most respects when it comes to military capability. The key to closing that gap quickly, they believe, lies in cyberspying and electronic warfare.
In its annual report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense noted: "The PLA identifies electronic warfare as a way to reduce or eliminate U.S. technological advantages, and considers it an integral component of warfare." It said the PLA intends to use radio, radar, optical, infrared and microwave frequencies to suppress or deceive enemy electronic equipment.
Obtaining technologies from advanced nations and using electronic means to cripple the enemy is a "force multiplier" that levels the playing field. The newly minted PLA Strategic Support Force will focus on these objectives.
THE BARREL OF XI'S GUN A closer look at Xi's words and deeds reveals that he sees military reform as the last step in solidifying his power base. He is looking to shake up the only institution that could unseat him, uprooting the networks of power and vested interests that have built up over the years in the seven military regions. In their place, Xi is creating a structure directly answerable to him.
"We must learn from the serious discipline- and law-breaching activities of (former top generals) Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. By weaving a basket of strict rules, we must remove the breeding ground of corruption," Xi said in a speech last November.
Three and a half years into his term, Xi is conducting an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, jailing both high-level "tigers" and lower-ranking "flies." Those purged include former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua -- former President Hu Jintao's closest aide -- and the two highest ranking men in uniform, Guo and Xu.
Xi is feared as the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. But his anti-graft drive has made him countless enemies. The one institution that poses a true threat to his rule is the military.
As chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi is the supreme commander of the armed forces. Xi knows, however, that the soldiers' allegiance is to their immediate superiors.
A soldier in his 20s from Hunan Province said he gives most of his monthly salary to his immediate boss. "Otherwise there is no chance of promotion." If he does manage to secure a higher position, he may see more money flow his way.
One of the 15 units to be created under the Central Military Commission is the Discipline Inspection Commission, a carbon copy of the Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Led by graft-buster Wang Qishan, the commission has jailed thousands of officials. Just as he has used the anti-corruption campaign to strengthen his position in the party, Xi will deploy the new body to shore up his power base in the military.
One notable change was placing the Chinese People's Armed Police directly under the Central Military Commission. The police, with their olive green uniforms, were previously separate from the PLA. Their ex-boss is jailed former security czar Zhou Yongkang.
Late on March 19, 2012, and into the early morning hours the next day, just days after ex-Politburo member Bo Xilai was removed from his post as Chongqing party secretary, people witnessed unusual troop movements in Beijing. Rumors of a coup spread on the Internet.
The armed forces under then-President Hu and Zhou's police faced off, the rumor goes, possibly over the custody of Xu Ming, the billionaire Dalian businessman and patron of Bo Xilai. Could Zhou have been trying to prevent Xu from testifying against his protege Bo and himself?
What was actually going on may never come to light because last December Xu Ming suddenly died of a suspicious heart attack in prison. The move to bring the police under Xi's thumb shows that the leadership had concerns the police might become a "second army" and run amok.
China's military reform effort thus appears to be as much about Xi's political survival as it is about preparing for war, something the PLA has not engaged in for almost 40 years.
asia.nikkei
"We can see that China is operating within Norwegian networks to obtain information that it can use in its own technological development," Lunde said, warning that some of the military secrets had already been integrated into China's weaponry. He did not say which technologies or companies were targeted, but neighboring Denmark's experience offers some pointers.
Danish national broadcaster DR reported in 2014 that for a period of four years "a foreign power had access to the computer systems of at least five different companies in the Danish defense industry." One is thought to be Terma, Denmark's largest defense contractor and, more importantly, a subcontractor to U.S. aerospace company Lockheed Martin for its fifth-generation fighter jet, the F-35. Terma supplies a variety of high-tech components and composite materials for the F-35, according to the company's website.
The fighter is co-funded by Britain, Canada, Australia, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. The large number of countries involved increases the opportunities for espionage.
In January, the hawkish Chinese newspaper Global Times published a story saying China had "mastered" the six key technologies of the F-35. The story had close-up photos of China's homegrown twin-engine stealth fighter, the J-20. The improvements made since the prototype was unveiled in 2011, and its striking resemblance to the F-35, surprised analysts.
LEAN AND HUNGRY LOOK This episode and a series of speeches by President Xi Jinping over the past six months give a glimpse into China's strategic thinking and direction. The leadership wants to transform the People's Liberation Army from a land-based military with a Soviet-inspired command structure -- that has not seen combat since 1979 -- into a leaner, more deadly force that can win a modern war. That means a greater focus on naval and air power, and the use of cyber and electronic warfare to reduce the gap with its hypothetical adversary, the U.S.
Since last September, Xi has given a number of speeches on the need for military reform. The measures include slashing the size of the PLA by 300,000; scrapping the country's seven military regions and replacing them with five new theater commands; establishing a new rocket force and strategic support force equal in status to the army, navy and air force; and dismantling the four powerful bureaucratic silos -- staff, politics, logistics and armaments -- reorganizing them into 15 new agencies directly answerable to the Central Military Commission, led by Xi.
"As the country progresses from a large country to a large and powerful one, defense and military development stands at a new and historic starting line," Xi said at a meeting of the Central Military Commission in Beijing last November. In March, speaking at a ceremony marking the launch of the five theater commands, Xi said: "We need to establish a highly effective chain of command so that when we fight we will definitely win." In his speeches, Xi emphasizes creating a military that can "win wars" -- an admission that the PLA, in its current form, would struggle to win a modern battle.
China will cut its noncombat divisions -- singers, dancers, chefs, hospital staff, journalists -- and focus on areas the PLA needs to strengthen, such as cyberwarfare, drones, intercepting enemy aircraft and rescuing hostages.
The seven military regions were created primarily to prevent a ground invasion from the Soviet Union and to quell uprisings in the west. Today, a Russian invasion is much less likely than a confrontation in the South or East China seas.
Most of China's pressing concerns are at sea, so most of its military spending will be devoted to strengthening its navy. China is building a second aircraft carrier in the northeastern port of Dalian, and fighters to fly from it.
To keep U.S. aircraft carriers away from the territorial waters China claims, Beijing is developing anti-ship ballistic missiles, including the Dongfeng DF-21. These "carrier killers" are part of China's so-called anti-access/area denial strategy. An advanced version, the DF-26, is China's first intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching U.S. bases on Guam.
Although the new weapons are intimidating, China's leaders know they are years behind the U.S. in most respects when it comes to military capability. The key to closing that gap quickly, they believe, lies in cyberspying and electronic warfare.
In its annual report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense noted: "The PLA identifies electronic warfare as a way to reduce or eliminate U.S. technological advantages, and considers it an integral component of warfare." It said the PLA intends to use radio, radar, optical, infrared and microwave frequencies to suppress or deceive enemy electronic equipment.
Obtaining technologies from advanced nations and using electronic means to cripple the enemy is a "force multiplier" that levels the playing field. The newly minted PLA Strategic Support Force will focus on these objectives.
THE BARREL OF XI'S GUN A closer look at Xi's words and deeds reveals that he sees military reform as the last step in solidifying his power base. He is looking to shake up the only institution that could unseat him, uprooting the networks of power and vested interests that have built up over the years in the seven military regions. In their place, Xi is creating a structure directly answerable to him.
"We must learn from the serious discipline- and law-breaching activities of (former top generals) Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. By weaving a basket of strict rules, we must remove the breeding ground of corruption," Xi said in a speech last November.
Three and a half years into his term, Xi is conducting an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, jailing both high-level "tigers" and lower-ranking "flies." Those purged include former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua -- former President Hu Jintao's closest aide -- and the two highest ranking men in uniform, Guo and Xu.
Xi is feared as the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. But his anti-graft drive has made him countless enemies. The one institution that poses a true threat to his rule is the military.
As chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi is the supreme commander of the armed forces. Xi knows, however, that the soldiers' allegiance is to their immediate superiors.
A soldier in his 20s from Hunan Province said he gives most of his monthly salary to his immediate boss. "Otherwise there is no chance of promotion." If he does manage to secure a higher position, he may see more money flow his way.
One of the 15 units to be created under the Central Military Commission is the Discipline Inspection Commission, a carbon copy of the Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Led by graft-buster Wang Qishan, the commission has jailed thousands of officials. Just as he has used the anti-corruption campaign to strengthen his position in the party, Xi will deploy the new body to shore up his power base in the military.
One notable change was placing the Chinese People's Armed Police directly under the Central Military Commission. The police, with their olive green uniforms, were previously separate from the PLA. Their ex-boss is jailed former security czar Zhou Yongkang.
Late on March 19, 2012, and into the early morning hours the next day, just days after ex-Politburo member Bo Xilai was removed from his post as Chongqing party secretary, people witnessed unusual troop movements in Beijing. Rumors of a coup spread on the Internet.
The armed forces under then-President Hu and Zhou's police faced off, the rumor goes, possibly over the custody of Xu Ming, the billionaire Dalian businessman and patron of Bo Xilai. Could Zhou have been trying to prevent Xu from testifying against his protege Bo and himself?
What was actually going on may never come to light because last December Xu Ming suddenly died of a suspicious heart attack in prison. The move to bring the police under Xi's thumb shows that the leadership had concerns the police might become a "second army" and run amok.
China's military reform effort thus appears to be as much about Xi's political survival as it is about preparing for war, something the PLA has not engaged in for almost 40 years.
asia.nikkei