Online extremism in Malaysia is a matter of national and regional
security. In May last year, Malaysian Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi
reported that 75 per cent of supporters of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) - variously known as ISIL, Islamic State and Daesh - were
recruited online.
As of January this year, the Malaysian police have arrested 153
people for suspected links to ISIS, successfully thwarting possible
attacks. However, Malaysian ISIS fighters and supporters continue to
thrive on social media platforms such as Facebook.
While Malaysia has the legal recourse to combat real-world terrorism -
such as the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act, or Sosma - on top
of nascent counter-radicalisation and counter-ideological efforts,
Kuala Lumpur cannot ignore the thousands among its citizens who believe
that they are contributing to ISIS' cause through their online "ribat",
or guarding of military frontiers. There is an urgent need for these
online radicals to be engaged in counter-narratives, for theirs is but a
small step away from real-world militancy.
Malaysian online extremists, including mere Facebook "friends" of
militants as well as hackers and "tech experts", believe that they are
"Cyber-ISIS", or that they are conducting ribat online. Social media is
their frontier, online content their cavalry and swords, and friendship
binds them together; their enemies are those who spread falsehoods about
the dawlah (ISIS), as well as online Shi'ites, infidels and supporters
of the tawaghut (idolaters).
In their very hearts, they perceive their online activities as
participation in the real-world battles on the ground. And in some
cases, these activities become realised into actual travel, planning of
attacks and co-coordinating of clandestine cells, which, in Malaysia,
has led to arrests. However, the authorities need to look deeper into
online ribat and curb radical activities further upstream.
MULTITUDE OF MEANINGS Malaysian
online extremists have been complicit in shaping and building online
and real-world communities of extremists. They have followed the journey
of militants like Lotfi Ariffin (left) - who died in Syria in 2014 -
producing and distributing extremist content from "ISIS Central". PHOTO:
THE STAR/ASIA NEWS NETWORK
The authorities have to be familiar with ribat in its various
military and non-military usages, particularly in dealing with the
strategy of Daesh (as ISIS is known in Arabic) on the ground and online.
According to the Brill Encyclopaedia of Islam, ribat carries a
multitude of meanings.
In non-military usage, ribat means a building prepared and put aside
for ritualistic, academic and educational activities of the fuqaha
(scholars of jurisprudence) and the Sufis. Ribat in this sense may be
linked to jihad but only in the non-violent and symbolic sense, that is,
against "the self".
The associated meanings that come with ribat originate from its
military usage as a military-religious institution, originally linked to
tribal warfare, implying the preparations made when mustering cavalry
before battle.
Much later, along with the changes in the way the Arabs conducted
their wars through the ages, a ribat became associated with
fortifications and buildings, such as the observation tower. As a verbal
noun of the verb rabata, it implies attachment to a place, or a person,
just as horses are required to be, having been gathered ready for
combat. In the Quran (8:60), ribat is the assembling of battle horses
for warfare as a show of force to deter the enemy.
Through the evolution of its use by Muslim armies in warfare in the
past centuries, ribat has been supplied with the notion of the
"frontier" that was injected by the period of conquests in Islamic
history. It is a concept of observation, standing guard and of
preparation for an impending skirmish, deployment, battle or movement,
and may or may not involve the necessary religious or military education
or indoctrination. VICTORIES FOR MALAYSIA'S CYBER RIBAT
Malaysian online murabitun or extremists - those who undertake cyber
ribat - have been complicit in shaping and building online and
real-world communities of extremists. They are supporters and
sympathisers of radicals who could not afford the trip to Syria, were
advised not to go or have yet to find the courage to leave Malaysia and
their families behind. Their first victory online was to provide ISIS
with a dominant grasp of the online jihadi conversation in the
Malay-speaking world.
Since 2013, the online murabitun followed the journey of extremists
such as Lotfi Ariffin, producing and distributing extremist content,
from the daily lives of fighters in Syria to calls for jihad and even
material such as logos, pictures and videos from "ISIS Central". They
have been consistently defending the presence of their community online
by tactically using social media - for instance, by persistently
creating new accounts, adding new friends and helping extremists to
verify and resurface accounts that have been shut down.
After the Malaysian fighters left Ajnad Ash-Sham Ajnad Ash-Sham, a
rebel group active in the civil war in Syria which Lotfi was said to
have joined, and joined ISIS, these online extremists did not hesitate
in staying abreast with the change in ideological or doctrinal leaning
and loyalty. Admittedly, this swing in online support was long due, with
ISIS dominating other extremist groups in terms of public online
presence.
It is worth noting that since then, there has not been any news of
new Malaysian fighters joining any other groups in Syria. In January
this year, the 11 Malaysians who were arrested for planning attacks and
attempting to travel to Syria were wholly linked to ISIS. END RIBAT, BEGIN REHABILITATION
Regardless of whether they are responsible for a complete
Daesh-isation of real-world Malaysian jihad, intentionally or
unknowingly, they have allowed their audience to enter into the
alternative world of ISIS; they know how to dress, speak, think and use
social media like an extremist. They have contributed to the building of
an ideological repository of Daesh ethics - what they should and should
not do or like.
They are complicit in the creation of the extremist information
market, and their sense of community. When there is a threat to the
community, they alert the others and provide suggested solutions. When a
fighter dies, they grieve or celebrate together and when a member is
caught, they alert others of enemies among themselves. As a result,
fighters do indeed gain from audience participation. They can gauge who
among the audience are potential friends or recruits.
Online murabitun with dangerous levels of radicalisation should not
be left alone just because they are not an immediate threat. Those who
have yet to be dangerously radicalised need to be rescued and guided
back into society for their own safety and for the security of Malaysia.
