INTRODUCTION
Since cyberspace makes us all neighbors, more nations are likely to be affected by confl icts in
cyberspace than in the air, land or sea. These nations will have to take more active steps to stop
attack traffi c if they wish to remain neutral.
Nations are increasingly looking to limit future confl icts, to bring these under more control, just
as more traditional wars were restrained through treaties, conventions and norms. But it is still
unknown how well the old agreements will hold up and what must be reinvented because of the
nature of cyberspace and cyber confl ict.
One of the most important norms has been for states to be able to remain neutral in response
to international confl ict, with rights and responsibilities guaranteed by the Hague Convention.
Because of the nature of cyber confl ict, such legal norm may be less useful than a modifi ed
norm of political neutrality. The Internet protocols themselves route cyber attacks through any
number of neutral countries, cyber confl icts are usually not so destructive to obviously trigger
international law, and the identity or nationality of belligerents may not be obvious.
Nations might (and probably should) accordingly come under political pressure to take
reasonable steps to stop cyber attacks, regardless of whether or not it is a formal treaty
obligation. This paper examines one aspect of this, political neutrality in cyber confl ict. New
norms will develop as “not my problem” will no longer be acceptable.
This paper will start the examination of political neutrality with a literature review of neutrality
and cyber confl ict, especially the legal aspects which features in most of the literature.
However, after this introductory section, the paper shifts from legal to political neutrality,
which allows more fl exibility to adapt to the nature of cyber confl ict. After this, the paper
moves on to specifi c ways a nation could be less than neutral, tied to a ten-point spectrum to
help understand responsibility and neutrality. A notional example of a cyber confl ict illustrates
how political neutrality might work in practice and highlights four factors likely to infl uence
political neutrality – severity, obviousness, “stoppability,” and duration – and areas for further
research.
Read all the paper:
http://www.acus.org/files/Healey_conference_cyber_conflict_national_responsibility.pdf
Since cyberspace makes us all neighbors, more nations are likely to be affected by confl icts in
cyberspace than in the air, land or sea. These nations will have to take more active steps to stop
attack traffi c if they wish to remain neutral.
Nations are increasingly looking to limit future confl icts, to bring these under more control, just
as more traditional wars were restrained through treaties, conventions and norms. But it is still
unknown how well the old agreements will hold up and what must be reinvented because of the
nature of cyberspace and cyber confl ict.
One of the most important norms has been for states to be able to remain neutral in response
to international confl ict, with rights and responsibilities guaranteed by the Hague Convention.
Because of the nature of cyber confl ict, such legal norm may be less useful than a modifi ed
norm of political neutrality. The Internet protocols themselves route cyber attacks through any
number of neutral countries, cyber confl icts are usually not so destructive to obviously trigger
international law, and the identity or nationality of belligerents may not be obvious.
Nations might (and probably should) accordingly come under political pressure to take
reasonable steps to stop cyber attacks, regardless of whether or not it is a formal treaty
obligation. This paper examines one aspect of this, political neutrality in cyber confl ict. New
norms will develop as “not my problem” will no longer be acceptable.
This paper will start the examination of political neutrality with a literature review of neutrality
and cyber confl ict, especially the legal aspects which features in most of the literature.
However, after this introductory section, the paper shifts from legal to political neutrality,
which allows more fl exibility to adapt to the nature of cyber confl ict. After this, the paper
moves on to specifi c ways a nation could be less than neutral, tied to a ten-point spectrum to
help understand responsibility and neutrality. A notional example of a cyber confl ict illustrates
how political neutrality might work in practice and highlights four factors likely to infl uence
political neutrality – severity, obviousness, “stoppability,” and duration – and areas for further
research.
Read all the paper:
http://www.acus.org/files/Healey_conference_cyber_conflict_national_responsibility.pdf